Musical Platonism in Modern Culture by Goehring, Edmund J.
Musical Platonism in Modern Culture 
By Edmund J Goehring 
" ... a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not 
arguments." (Plato Phaedo 6lb) 
Not too long ago, the Atlantic Monthly, one of the better-known organs of 
modern culture and thinking about it, ran a commentary on music in con-
temporary society by the art critic Jody Bottum. The main objective of 
"The Soundtracking of America" (March 2000) is to topple music from its 
present-day position of cultural supremacy. Bottum contends that music 
does not deserve its place of superiority over the poetic arts, in particular, 
because it is intellectually barren. Incapable of generating meaning with-
out help from elsewhere, music must latch on to an external, largely ver-
bal system of beliefs for it to have coherence or utility. Without such moor-
ings, music becomes a destabilizing force in society. 
The desire to restore music to its old subservience to poetry, a position 
it has not held for some two centuries, resonates strongly in many circles 
of contemporary social/political thought, including academic ones. Not 
only are Bottum's concerns related to ongoing questions about music's 
place among the other arts; more broadly, they draw on a larger academic 
debate about the ability of any individual discipline, not just music, to gen-
erate its own meaning. The purpose of the present essay is to examine the 
sources and implications of this modern effort to explain music through 
external, non-musical standards. First, it will excavate the philosophical 
roots of this anti-musical prejudice. Here, the argument will be that the 
move to circumscribe music within the ambit of the verbal arts or a philo-
sophical system turns on a specific reading-or, more likely, a misread-
ing-of Platonic thought. Approaching music in this way leads both to 
errors about the general nature of music and also to misinterpretations of 
specific works. Second, this essay will suggest that there are other, more 
compelling ways of conceiving music, including ones that grant music au-
tonomy from external standards without a loss of intelligibility or mean-
ingfulness. 
Bottum's argument about music turns on two axes: an observation about 
its current use and a judgment about music itself. The observation is that 
music today-specifically, music fragmented into clips of sound-furrows 
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into our public spaces and our private lives. This practice causes harm, 
Bottum argues, because such fragments score our individual and collec-
tive psyches. Many might indeed sympathize with Bottum and, like him, 
want to scurry for cover from this deluge of sonic shrapnel. But then his 
reasoning takes an awkward turn as it goes from observation to theoriza-
tion; that is, as Bottum consciously exchanges the role of cultural observer 
for that of philosopher about music. If presented with a line-up of sus-
pected saboteurs of music, many might finger a consumerist society as a 
main culprit in this act of fragmentation. Bottum, instead, blames the cul-
tural misuse of music on music itself. Here is one version of his striking 
claim that music itself causes moral decay: "People began to imagine that 
morality was a set of feelings rather than a system of ideas at around the 
time they began to be able to evoke any mood they wanted by putting a 78 
on a phonograph" (58).1 Our putative modern moral decline coincided 
with-was even caused by-the arrival of the record player. 
What is the philosophical grounding for this claim? Although he does 
not acknowledge it explicitly, the deepest influence is a specific vision of 
Platonism. Platonism is an unruly term, and a good first step in getting a 
grasp on Bottum's adaptation of it is to note that Platonism can be very 
different from what Plato actually says (a point that will return below). But 
at least one element of Bottum's aesthetics is a common feature of Pla-
tonic thought, and that is idealism. Platonic idealism holds that the mate-
rial world is a mere image of the eternal, perfect realm of ideas, ideas that 
exist independently of the visible world. In this ontology, an idea and its 
representation constitute two different things, and this dualism carries 
important consequences for a theory of art. For if an idea is conceived as 
both distinct from and superior to its image, then music, or any artistic 
medium for that matter, must attach itself to ideas if it is to be coherent or 
purposeful. Otherwise, art will please, but not instruct; it will move the 
listener, but not to any higher ethical purpose or vision. It will create an 
effect, but without a commensurate cause. So, it is Platonic dualism that 
provides the intellectual framework by which Bottum can criticize music 
for its misuse: without an idea to attach itself to, music becomes aimless, 
like a planet without a sun around which to orbit. 
From this exposition of Platonist aesthetics, one might wonder why 
music would be singled out for special rebuke. Wouldn't any art be equally 
corrosive were it to avert its eyes from that external, transcendent stan-
dard? Much of the argument rides on how one interprets the term "idea." 
In Bottum's view, "idea" is identical with "word." This equation helps to 
explain, for example, why he wants poetry restored to its earlier supremacy 
among the arts (a position that aesthetics and popular culture had ceded 
to music around the end of the eighteenth century). Unlike music, verbal 
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idioms like narrative, epic, and allegory belong to what Bottum calls the 
"explanatory arts" (59). The phrase "explanatory arts" shows Bottum's com-
mitment to logocentrism in the arts, yet it is an unfortunate expression, 
because it shows a limited understanding of poetry, not to mention music. 
The phrase also marks an important instance in which Bottum's Platonism 
loses sight of what Plato actually says. From a more authentically Platonic 
view, words, like sounds, do not exist in the realm of ideas: both are im-
ages, hazy representations of pure ideas. (The Platonic argument that writ-
ing impedes the genuine internalization of wisdom is most dramatically 
expressed toward the end of the Phaedrus, in Socrates' telling of the tale of 
Theuth.) But in Bottum's variant on Platonic thought, words get associ-
ated with the rational faculty, music with unruly passion. Hence Bottum's 
claim that "music is not a rational art and cannot express an actual idea" 
(64). 
This is a common sentiment about music. It penetrates deeply into 
Western aesthetics, and, whether or not it gets its Plato right, thought like 
Bottum's has often been traced to Platonic dualism and ascribed to think-
ers steeped in Plato. Augustine offers an obvious early example of a Platonist 
who wrestled with music as an expression of the corruptible and the ephem-
eral. To be sure, Augustine shows a welcome ambivalence toward music (a 
virtue mostly lacking in Bottum's rigid Platonism),2 but he ultimately as-
signs music only an ancillary role in a spiritual life. At its best, music can be 
a useful tool for aiding weak minds in the contemplation of divine words. 
Although just about everything else in an Augustinian cosmology also lacks 
such intrinsic value, music stands out as an especially treacherous art. As 
Augustine puts it in the Confessions, music can paralyze the mind by gratifY-
ing the senses (10.33). 
The view of music as an evil, or at least as something incapable of 
goodness without proper regulation or orientation, prevailed for well more 
than a millennium after Augustine, in secular as well as ecclesiastical circles. 
Even in the eighteenth century, a time when instrumental music began to 
liberate itself from theoretical and practical dependence on poetry, 
Platonism of this sort maintained a robust presence. Rousseau notoriously 
likened instrumental music to an incompetent representational painting, 
which needs subtitles to explain it: this is a tree, this is a horse (1767). Kant 
also ranked instrumental music below vocal music in value. It is just enter-
tainment, he opines, because it allows for the contemplation ofform only, 
not of ideas (1790: 1.1.2 §53). Joseph Addison gives a useful summary of 
this line of thought when he argues that music does not deduce principles 
from itself but from general principles of taste. Music, or any other art, 
conforms to taste, an external standard, not taste to music (1711). Indeed, 
Addison'sjudgment closely resembles Bottum's own assertion that "music 
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produces its effect without demanding a philosophical frame" (64). 
This hierarchical view of knowledge reaches well beyond inquiry into 
a sensuous medium like music. One of its more recent manifestations in 
public discourse is in the area of higher education. Taking a moment to 
look at how it influences debates about a liberal education can set into 
relief the premises and priorities of Bottum's thinking about music. For 
example, Alasdair MacIntyre, whose thought influences Bottum's in other 
contexts, recently argued that an individual discipline cannot answer ques-
tions of its own significance. Be it a member of the arts or the sciences, any 
specialized area of inquiry needs the lens of philosophy (or theology) to 
correct its congenital myopia.3 MacIntyre's thought in turn draws on that 
of John Henry Newman. From the premise that "all knowledge forms one 
whole, because its subject-matter is one," Newman posits the need for a 
special discipline or habit of thought that can set the proper boundaries 
for these discrete areas of inquiry: 
The comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, 
and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and 
adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, 
this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of 
them, and in some sense a science of sciences, which is my own 
conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of 
the word, and of a philosophical habit of mind. (1982:38) 
Philosophy, so conceived, resembles a benevolent version of To Ike in's one 
ring, which brings in all of the disciplines and binds them together. 
To turn back to thinking about music within this framework, Bottum's 
distinction between representation and idea takes the form of a lament. 
Music in the modern world occasions moral decay because it is now 
untethered from what he calls a "public metaphysics-a shared belief in 
the coherent relations among God and nature and human culture" (64). 
Bottum's plaint has two aspects-a historical and an ideological one. There 
was a time, he asserts, when things were better, and they were better not 
because music itself was a different sort of thing then, but because a meta-
physical framework was in place to give music coherence. Bottum's argu-
ment is problematic on both the historical and internal grounds. In for-
mulating an objection to the nostalgic side of his argument, one could 
start by asking: where was this "public metaphysics," this "shared belief in 
the coherent relations among God and nature and human culture"? 
Bottum's argument never ventures out to give the content of this public 
metaphysics: it stays in the safe harbor of generalities. (Nor does MacIntyre 
say what his philosophically grounded curriculum would look like.) He 
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does, however, tell us which works exemplify this shared belief: the Saint 
Matthew Passion, for example, or the Messiah, or Beethoven's Ninth Sym-
phony. All are large works, generally public in posture, and have some 
kind of religious connotation. But although they are public in this loose 
sense (as opposed, say, to the more private world of chamber music or the 
intimate one of the Romantic character piece), even a casual look at these 
pieces shows that, if they are "saying" anything at all, they do so in a way 
that differentiates and discriminates, as opposed to expressing a shared 
public metaphysics. 
Take Handel's Messiah. Today it accompanies any number of public 
ceremonies, whether sacred or secular. But CharlesJennens, the author of 
the text (which Handel took without alteration), conceived the Messiah as 
an attack on specific factions of religious thought, especially Dissenters, 
Deists, and anti-clerics, in defense of a more orthodox view of Christian-
ity.4 The existence of the Messiah, then, springs from a recognition of op-
posing world views. Bottum also mentions an Enlightenment confidence 
present in, for example, Mozart (69). Presumably, he means the operas. 
This argument holds up, perhaps, for Figaro, but it is hard to know what 
kind of optimism about human nature and its potential is present in the 
character of Don Giovanni. Mozart's operas resist such univocal readings 
as a group and even individually. Indeed, a moment in COSt fan tutte offers 
a cautionary tale about this Platonist search for a shared, idealistic view of 
things. Early in the opera, Don Alfonso, a philosopher no less, equates the 
overblown confidence in female fidelity with the Arabian phoenix: "every-
one says that it exists," he reports, "but no one knows where." Bottum's 
public metaphysics is like the Arabian phoenix. 
Perhaps my objections will be perceived as an unwitting vindication of 
Bottum's position. These and other pieces, one might suggest, indeed as-
pire to a shared view of things. What counts is the ambition, not its success. 
If it should turn out that not everyone gets the idea behind the music-
well, that is not music's fault. I think that Bottum's argument cannot be 
saved by this more generous reading, nor would he likely want it to be. 
Bottum argues not just for any metaphysics-a mere aspiration toward any 
metaphysics is not enough for him-but for the realization of a distinctly 
public one (however that is defined). The sense that things really were 
better once upon a time is integral to his argument. 
However one responds to the historical side of Bottum's objections to 
music, the internal side of his argument poses a separate and potentially 
more intractable set of problems. The central question here is whether 
meaning in a musical work stems from attachment to an extra-musical 
framework of meaning. A way to test this theory is to look at an individual 
work that Bottum cites as exemplary, such as the Saint Matthew Passion. At 
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first glance, Bach's masterpiece would seem like a perfect candidate for 
his Platonist aesthetics. This work apparently conveys an idea and, what is 
more, a verbal one with a moral and theological purpose. But what, pre-
cisely, does this music qua theology preach? According to the historian 
J aroslav Pelikan, the text meditates on the Anselmic sacrifice theory of the 
crucifixion. Briefly, this is how the theological argument goes: neither Adam 
nor his descendants can provide satisfaction for original sin. Only some-
one innocent can do this, and it is the death of Christ that allows God to 
forgive the sin of Adam without violating divine justice (Pelikan 1986:91-
93). 
Here is Anselm's formulation of the doctrine: 
Therefore hold thou most firmly, that without satisfaction-that 
is, without the spontaneous payment of the debt-neither can God 
release the sinner unpunished, nor the sinner attain to such bliss 
as he enjoyed before his sin; not in that way could man be restored 
to what he was before sinning. (Cur Deus Homo 1.19) 
The glosses on the biblical narrative of Bach's Passion clearly invoke this 
view. The massive opening chorus, for example, contains this exchange 
between two of the choruses: 
Sehet! Was? Seht die Geduld. 
Seht! Wohin? Auf unsre Schuld. 
[Behold! What? Behold his forbearance. 
Look! Whence? To our own guilt.] 
Or, in the recitative "0 Schmerz" (No. 19), the chorus inteIjects this cho-
rale text 
Was ist die Ursach' aller so1cher Plagen? 
Ach, meine Sun den haben dich geschlagen! 
Ich, ach Herr Jesu, habe dies verschuldet, 
Was du erduldet! 
[What is the source of these sufferings? Ah, my sins have stricken 
thee! I, LordJesus, am responsible for what you have endured.] 
Passages like these might seem to vindicate Bottum's point, that this 
music derives its ability to do more than evoke emotion by attaching itself 
to an idea. But I think that the evidence winds up showing something like 
the reverse. Turning again to Pelikan is instructive. One of the tenets of 
his history of doctrine is that ritual and liturgy precede theology: one prac-
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tices first, and then one afterward reflects on the belief expressed through 
the practice. The Saint Matthew Passion represents a profound instantiation 
of this theory. As pure doctrine, the Anselmic satisfaction theory is fraught 
with intellectual inconsistencies. For example, in so assiduously attending 
to the crucifixion, it renders the resurrection an afterthought. As Pelikan 
argues, moving the satisfaction theory of the atonement "from devotion to 
dogmatics, from meditation to systematic theology, created enormous prob-
lems .... With the elimination of its full liturgical and sacramental con-
text, it did not make sense" (1986:100-01).5 Bach's music is tied to ritual 
and devotion; it is not, finally, theology in sound. This claim stands Bottum's 
theory on its head: the idea does not make the music intelligible; the mu-
sic makes the idea intelligible. Music does not block off our access to ideas; 
rather, it is a necessary means of accessing them. 
There is even more to it than that: a viable theory of art needs some way of 
holding together image and idea. Failing to do so can produce unpersuasive 
analytical and hermeneutical results, as can be seen in looking at the most 
enduring analytical legacy of a Platonist music aesthetics. This is the theory 
of imitation. Although as capacious a term as Platonism itself, mimesis as 
historically applied to music generally codified the superiority of the ver-
bal arts over the musical ones. What is it that music imitates? For most of 
the history of Western music, the usual answer was, the text-either an 
image contained in or an emotion generated by it. Imitation, so under-
stood, has undeniable use for describing much vocal music. The Saint 
Matthew Passion, for example, is saturated with musical images that "imi-
tate" the words of the Bible and the poetic interpolations on them. In the 
first musical excerpt below, taken from the monumental opening chorus, 
the plodding bass line evokes the labored steps to Gethsemane (ex. 1). 
The passage after that, from "0 Schmerz" (No. 25), gives the pulsating 
bass line that imitates the "trembling heart" (ex. 2). Other obvious in-
stances of music that takes its cues from the text are the renderings of 
earthquakes (No. 63a) and the crowing of the cock (No. 38c), as well as 
the halo effect that the strings provide to all but one of the settings of 
Jesus' words. 
Such descriptive musical language reflects the heart-felt Pietism and 
earnest didacticism that counterbalance the mighty austerity of Bach's 
masterpiece. But this word-based approach toils mightily to account for 
the majesty of the work. Logocentrism taken on its own ultimately trivializes 
the music, making it into a kind of high lighter for the text. To take stock of 
the genuine value of Bach's work, one must look elsewhere, to his mastery 
of polyphony, the power of his harmonies, his handling of rhythm, his 
melodic and thematic invention-aspects of Bach's. style that Bottum un-
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Example 1: Bach, St. Matthew Passion, no. 1, mm. 1-6. 
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Example 2: Bach, St. Matthew Passion, no. 25, mm. 1-2. 
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derplays. Mter all, Bach was not the first or only person to set a Passion 
text to music, nor is he exceptional in using descriptive musical imagery. 
So, it is not the character of the words that is decisive in giving this piece 
particular significance; it is the character of the music. 
Another way of framing this objection to Platonist music aesthetics is 
to argue that you can't judge a tune by its words. Bottum, true to his pseudo-
Platonist reading of music, has fun ridiculing tunes with inane texts. For 
example, what does it mean, he asks, that "MacArthur Park is melting in 
the rain./ I don't think that I can take it / 'Cause it took so long to bake it 
/ And I'll never have that recipe again" (66) ? This is an instance of profun-
dity without coherence, an emotional indulgence that makes us weak-
minded, according to Bottum. But he is being disingenuously selective in 
his examples. He does not mention Schubert songs set to Goethe texts or 
Monteverdi madrigals set to Tasso. One can think of instances of good 
music set to bad texts (this has been said of Picander's poetic interpola-
tions in Bach's Saint Matthew Passion), bad music set to good texts (certain 
madrigals), good music set to good texts (certain other madrigals), and, of 
course, bad music set to bad texts. In the evaluation of a vocal work, it does 
not matter, finally, whether the poetry is weak or strong. As Edward Cone 
reminds us, the text is the composer's to do with as he will: 
The words, that is, have become a part of the composer's message, 
utterances of his own voice. In a sense, he composes his own text. 
Some poems are designed to be set to music, others are written 
with no such intent. No matter: in either case the song composer 
considers that the poem is his to use. (1974:18-19) 
The composer's principles are musical ones, and these do not always work 
in tandem with poetic ones. 
The theory of imitation shows even greater cracks when one seeks to 
describe and evaluate instrumental music. Not that the issue was always 
framed as a failure of theory; for many, the fault resided in music's inabil-
ity to live up to principles of imitation. The imposition of an imitative theory 
onto music was precisely what allowed Rousseau to equate instrumental 
music with a bad representational painting. The objection is misplaced, 
however. What needed adjusting was not instrumental music but rather a 
theory that, first, failed to recognize the internal sources of musical mean-
ing and coherence and that, second, faulted music for failing to live up to 
these externally imposed notions. Rousseau's method of argumentation 
resembles Bottum's: both put music into a box that it cannot get out of 
and then blame music for being unable to climb out of it. A famous ex-
ample of how greater verbal clarity and dependence on an external idea 
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Example 3: Vivaldi, Spring, II, mm. 1-3. "E quindi suI fiorito ameno prato/AI caro 
mormorio di fronde e piante/Dorme 'I caprar col fido can' a lato." [Trans: And then 
upon the flowery, pleasant meadow, to the rustling of the branches and the leaves, the 
goatherd sleeps with the faithful dog at his side.] 
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can render music not deep and meaningful, but banal, is Vivaldi's Four 
Seasons. The second movement of Spring, for instance, presents the musi-
cal image of a faithful dog, whose barking is rendered by the viola and 
whose obedience to his master is given by the repetition of two quarter 
notes, in every measure, at the same spot (ex. 3). The repeated viola line 
in imitation of the barking dog is not an aid to understanding as much as 
a gimmick. Bottum is partly aware of the deficiencies of this form of mime-
sis, but he is also beholden to the very theory he rejects. After all, he wants 
music valued not as a thing in itself, but as a vehicle for transmitting verbal 
knowledge instead of inchoate feeling. 
If the argument here is that no one should shed a tear to see Platonist 
models of musical analysis set to rest, what, then, should take their place? 
Is there a critical framework that better attends to the relation between 
sound and idea? Toward the end of the eighteenth century, a new concep-
tion gradually formed that began to remove music from the company of 
the imitative arts. Thomas Twining, for example, restricts imitation in music 
to the passions and ideas it raises. The medium itself is for him manifestly 
not imitative: 
The whole power of Music may be reduced, I think, to three distinct 
effects;-upon the ear, the passions, and the imagination: in other 
words, it may be considered as simply delighting the sense, as raising 
emotions, or, as raising ideas. The two last of these effects constitute 
the whole of what is called the moral (i.e., as affecting the mind 
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rather than the body), or expressive, power of Music; and in these 
only we are to look for anything that can be called imitation. Music 
can be said to imitate, no farther than as it expresses something. As 
far as its effect is merely physical, and confined to the ear, it gives 
a simple, original pleasure; it expresses nothing, it refers to nothing; 
it is no more imitative than the smell of a rose, or the flavor of a 
pineapple. ([1789] 1971:49)6 
Twining's interest is not in lumping the arts all together under a uni-
form standard but rather in attending to their unique properties. His an-
tipathy toward a conflation of the arts prompts a barb hurled at Rousseau 
(identified here under the alias of Plato): 
The complaint, so common, of the separation of Poetry and Music, 
and of the total want of meaning and expression in instrumental 
Music, was never, I believe, the complaint of a man of true musical 
feeling: and it might, perhaps, be not unfairly concluded, that 
Aristotle, who expressly allows that "Music, even without words, has 
expression" ... was more of a musician than his master Plato, who is 
fond of railing at instrumental music, and asks with Fontenelle,-
"Sonate, que me veux-tu?" [Sonata, what do you want of me?] 
(1775:49, n.s) 
Imitation as a concept did not vanish overnight, of course, and some 
thinkers tried to adjust it to the perception that music was in a fundamen-
tal way a different kind of art. We see this effort in the following commen-
tary by Adam Smith, in which the term "subject" is largely synonymous 
with "the object of imitation": 
What is called the subject of such music is merely, as has already 
been said, a certain leading combination of notes, to which it 
frequently returns, and to which all its digressions and variations 
bear a certain affinity. It is altogether different from what is called 
the subject of a poem or a picture, which is always something which 
is not either in the poem or in the picture, or something quite 
distinct from that combination, either of words on the one hand, 
or of colors on the other, of which they are respectively composed. 
The subject of a composition of instrumental music is a part of 
that composition: the subject of a poem or picture is no part of 
either. (1980:205)7 
Smith might be faulted only for placing poetry and painting among 
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the imitative arts. Some more modern aesthetic theories hold that, just as 
the subject of music is sound, so, too, are words that of poetry and colors 
and shapes that of painting. But Smith's main point, that music is self-
referential, marks a great change from earlier theories. Describing music 
as that which imitates other music holds together two essential but often 
conflicting requirements of music (or any art): that it have autonomy and 
that it be coherent.8 An entirely autonomous art with no frame of refer-
ence for its language would be unintelligible. Meanwhile, an entirely imi-
tative conception of music-which is, basically, Bottum's approach and 
which locates the frame of reference beyond the music-would render 
music trivial. 
These philosophical arguments about music are largely taking place on an 
abstract level. It is important that they not remain there: imitation began 
to collapse as a viable concept precisely from the recognition, based on 
empirical grounds, that meaning in music could be produced through 
music itself and characterized in musical terms. The result was a move 
toward more formal analytical approaches. Formal analysis does not sit 
well with Bottum, and one can see why. It is predicated on the integrity 
and meaningfulness of musical elements-of rhythm, timbre, texture, and 
harmony-a premise that runs contrary to his demand that music yield to 
a public metaphysics to gain coherence. The rejection of formal analysis 
betrays a deep anti-intellectualism. In the following passage, for example, 
Bottum compares the analysis of music to Herman Hesse's Glass Bead Game: 
it is "a complex and sophisticated rite filled with delicate connections per-
ceived [only] by its priestly scholastics, lacking any meaning, and consum-
ing the culture's intellectual and emotional energy" (70). One needs spe-
cific examples to counter this charge of esotericism and incoherence, and 
I will refer to two works, one vocal, one instrumental. In taking passages 
from Mozart, I do not wish to imply that Mozart's style is or should be 
normative. Rather, it is composers from the mainstream of Western classi-
cal music who occupy much of the contested territory in debates about 
music's meaning and its cultural value. 
The first example is "Se vuol ballare" from Le nozze di Figaro. As with 
the above-cited passages from the Saint Matthew Passion, parts of this aria 
can yield to a logocentric reading (ex. 4). The plucking ofthe strings imi-
tates the textual reference to the guitar; the second verse has the Count, at 
least in Figaro's imagination, leaping to the capriola (ex. 5); and the reign-
ing musical image of the text-dance-is also the prevailing poetic image. 
Unlike the kind of imitation espoused by Rousseau and exemplified in 
Vivaldi's Four Seasons, however, the images evoked in Da Ponte's text are all 
related to music, either via dance or via specific instruments. Mozart is not 
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Example 4: Mozart, Le nozze di Figaro, "Se vuol ballare," mm. 1-8. [Trans.: If you want to 
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Example 5: Mozart, Le nozze di Figaro, "Se vuol ballare," mm. 31-42, voice only. [Trans.: If 
you want to come to my school, I will teach you the capriola.] 
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imitating something extrinsic to music, but other music. Still, even this 
more refined conception of imitation falls short of explaining what is most 
expressive about Mozart's setting. Although Da Ponte's text refers to a 
dance and even specifies one, nothing in it, including the poetic meter, 
dictates the dance that Mozart ultimately chose, the minuet. The choice of 
the minuet is decisive for the character of the piece. It is the noblest of 
eighteenth-century dances, and Mozart amplifies this character by adding 
an accompaniment of ceremonial horns, which are also not mentioned in 
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the libretto. Read only as a text, "Se vuol ballare" describes a man bent on 
revenge. We know from the words that this person is probably clever, but 
we do not know if he is a simpatico type, or whether his cause is just. Only 
the musical setting tells us that Figaro is to be taken seriously, that he has, 
literally, a measure of dignity about him. Music like this creates meaning 
not by latching itself on to an external verbal idea but through its own 
medium. 
This is not the arcane analysis of a glass bead game. Rather, it points 
out audible and transparent details of the aria. We also see in this example 
from Figaro a harmony between music's numerical properties, manifested 
in rhythm, and its emotive sides. Again, these are two realms, like idea and 
representation, that Bottum wants to keep separate: 
Plenty of genuine ideas exist in music, of course; they're just not 
what we mean by "ideas" in any nonmusical sense. They express 
musical techniques and music's root mathematical structure, and 
exactly what they have to do with what we experience while listening 
is something no one has ever satisfactorily explained. (65) 
In denying a connection between the numerical and the audible proper-
ties of music, Bottum is not being attentive to Mozart or to his Shakespeare 
(not to mention Plato). A long tradition views music as number made au-
dible and musical rhythm as a means of conveying character and therefore 
as having an ethos. The ethical nature of music has been famously cel-
ebrated in the Merchant a/Venice: 
The man that hath no music in himself, 
Nor is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds, 
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils; 
The motions of his spirit are dull as night, 
And his affections dark as Erebus. (5.1.83-87) 
This is not to reduce music to a vehicle for conveying platitudes and 
moralisms. Rather, the argument is that music can have an ethos, and that 
it can convey through its own medium-its rhythms and harmonies-a 
coherent idea. 
This passage from Figaro shows that vocal music can have a meaning 
and character that are not dependent on words. Can the same be said of 
instrumental music? I'd like to consider a passage from the first movement 
of Mozart's Clarinet Concerto to show how strictly instrumental music can 
engage not only the heart but also the mind. The passage in question is 
one of the most stirring in the entire piece, a profound transformation of 
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the opening theme (ex. 6). In its original form at the beginning of the 
movement, this theme was decorative and cast in a thoroughly modern 
style for Mozart's time (ex. 7). The later passage, by contrast, conveys so-
lemnity and dignity through austere writing and through recollecting older, 
venerable polyphonic practices. (The entries of the main theme in the 
different instrumental parts of this passage are indicated with arrows in 
ex. 6.) This dignity results not just from texture but also from rhythm. The 
turn to half notes slows down the pacing of this section, and the entry of 
subsequent voices at the distance of the half note creates metrical uncer-
tainty: for a few measures (around mm. 128-30), the location of the down-
beat is unclear. Evoking older music and creating metrical ambiguity in 
this way arrest the forward progress of time, making this passage a tran-
scendent moment. At least since Mozart's day, certain traits of Renaissance 
and Baroque music have been associated with the elevated and the divine. 
Mozart's evocation of the stile antico as an emblem of the sacred continues 
to resonate today, contrary to Bottum's concern that modern habits have 
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If the meaning of this passage is clear when viewed in isolation, its 
larger context creates ambiguity. Immediately following this transcendent 
moment, a passage appears that bears little of this prior dignity (ex. 8). 
The units are now short and discrete, and they are repeated over a static, 
vamp-un til-ready harmonic pattern. The clarinet joins in this new mood 
by supplying busy-work in the form of sixteenth-note decorations of the 
harmonies. To describe this transition figuratively, we have abruptly moved 
from the church to the comic stage. 
How does one explain this juxtaposition of unlike things? Seeking some 
external standard-Bottum's "idea," in other words-is oflittle use here. 
Even using internal critera, erasing the ambiguity of this section would 
breach critical decorum with no gain in the intelligibility of this mixing of 
styles. The meaning and character of this part of the Clarinet Concerto 
derive from the coexistence of these incongruous elements and depict a 
beauty that is at once remote and piercing. The balancing between the 
elevated and the comic accounts for the melancholy that suffuses this work 
and many late works of Mozart. It is true that one marvels in the technical 
facility of this passage for its own sake-how the elevated passage can seem 
at once unexpected and yet deeply satisfYing. But this facility and ambigu-
ity, in gratifYing the senses, do not paralyze the mind. Rather, they prick 
the intellect into action. Having a piece run entirely true to convention 
would give it little emotional appeal by depriving it of intellectual interest. 
The equation of music with unruly emotion is a common move in much 
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philosophical speculation about music. There is good reason for this, of 
course: music holds a position as the most abstract of the arts, but also the 
most physical and visceral. Still, the exclusive identification of music with 
emotion leaves one having to choose between music either as the locus of 
the sensuous or else as a mere servant to poetry. One can agree that Allan 
Bloom is on to something when he calls music alogon-the pre-verbal, in-
articulate speech of the soul-without saying that that defines all of the 
experience of music. Likewise, one can marvel at the insight in 
Kierkegaard's distinction between Faust, an intellectual daemon and there-
fore a quintessentially literary type, and Don Giovanni, a musical and there-
fore erotic daemon, while still objecting to his exclusive association of music 
with the erotic. After all, every other character in Mozart's opera is also 
musical but does not behave in the same way. To philosophize about music 
should presuppose the question "which music?"; otherwise, taking too glo-
bal a perspective on a musical object can obscure the details of a work, 
details from which meaning arises. Even those popular songs that for 
Bottum come closest to his longed-for universality are praised for their 
"deep," "tragic" possibilities (the very sort of fuzzy language about music 
he derides in others). This stance closes off other regions of human ex-
pression and experience: the comic, the epigrammatic, the heroic, and 
the ironic. It seems as if Bottum's world has only one genre in it. 
In separating an idea from its medium, Platonism along the lines es-
poused by Bottum disallows our only access to ideas. The result is a theory 
that separates reason from feeling, meaning from sound. Of course we 
might be skeptical of music that renders an emotional effect without an 
adequate intellectual cause, as Wagner derisively said of French grand opera. 
But it is one thing to say that feeling is not identical to virtue, another to 
say that, if something is not verbal, it cannot be ethical, purposeful, or 
reasonable. Bottum cites a passage from Thomas Carlyle which he errone-
ously thinks supports his own argument about the inherent meaningless-
ness of music: "Who is there that, in logical words, can express the effect 
music has on us?" But for "music" one can easily substitute "dance," "po-
etry," "God," and many other things. In the end, these Platonic arguments 
try to reason needs for which there might be no verbal explanation, or at 
least where a verbal formulation would be inadequate. People sing hymns 
or anthems in church or during public ceremonies rather than just recite 
them because singing is more than a handy aid to memory; it brings a 
fuller commitment of the self, and also more meaning. Music speaks to a 
kind of experience and understanding that is inaccessible by other means. 
The paradox is that this Platonist objection to music might simplifY or 
misrepresent Plato himself, a point that is something of a subtext in my 
larger argument. I would like to close with this observation by referring to 
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a few passages from some of the dialogues. The epigram of this essay, from 
the Phaedo, gives the sense that Socrates had a death-bed conversion about 
poetry, because it shows that he endorsed poetry on its own terms, rather 
than as an underling to philosophy. In the Symposium, meanwhile, the char-
acter of Aristophanes offers the stirring notion of eros as the soul's longing 
for immortality. Socrates accepts this view and then elaborates on it in a 
remarkable way: when we finally answer the question of why we seek this 
immortality, the inquiry is over. "There is no need," Socrates says, "to ask 
the further question 'Why does one desire to be happy?'" This is a point 
where verbal inquiry cannot penetrate. Finally, we see Plato exploring the 
limits of verbal argument in the mysterious conclusion to the Crito, the 
dialogue whose action takes place the day before Socrates' death. Here, 
Socrates likens the voices of the Laws booming in his head to the melodies 
of the Corybantes, who celebrated religious rites with ecstatic dances. Their 
music is so loud that Socrates, the great dialectician, has become deaf to 
any verbal arguments that would dissuade him from accepting death. These 
texts seem to conclude that verbal argument can take you only so far. For 
the rest of the journey, you need the arts. 
Notes 
This essay is warmly dedicated to Chris Hatch in gratitude for many hours of con-
versation on this and other topics. I am also deeply grateful to Steven Mfeldt for 
his careful reading of several drafts of this paper. 
1. Bottum draws consciously on Alasdair MacIntyre's formulation of and at-
tack on emotivism, which Madntrye defines as "the doctrine that all evaluative 
judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions 
of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evalu-
ative in character." See MacIntyre (1984:11-12). The emphasis is MacIntyre's. 
2. For example, in De Musica, Augustine makes the argument, largely unprec-
edented at that time, that music and all of the arts are rational. He does so, how-
ever, by radically separating the general principles of art from its means of repre-
sentation. See Ellsmere and La Croix (1988:8-12). 
3. MacIntyre voiced this view in an address entitled "Catholic Universities: 
Dangers, Hopes, Choices," given at the conference "Higher Learning and Catho-
lic Traditions" (University of Notre Dame, October 1999). 
4. See Ruth Smith (1989:181-82). 
5. Michael Long takes a similar position in describing the ritualistic aspects of 
early fifteenth-century sacred music, particularly that of Josquin: "[T] he late me-
dieval polyphonic Mass was rarely conceived by or for theologians, and repre-
sented the artistic response of one individual to the mystery and promises of re-
demption inherent in its liturgical texts and ritual." See Long (1989:21). 
6. The quotation comes toward the beginning of Dissertation II: "On the 
Different Senses of the Word, Imitative, as Applied to Music by the Antients, and 
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by the Moderns." 
7. This passage appears in section 2.31 of the essay. 
8. For an elegant modern formulation of this view, see Allanbrook (1983:3-
9). 
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